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Reason and Will

For many years, more precisely, since Aristotle, reason and will have been separate faculties in people: On the one hand, one should recognise the world as it is (and in the process, not be deceived). On the other hand, one should wish for the good and do good (and in the process, not allow oneself to be deceived). In Kant, one can still find this separation in the distinction between pure and practical reason. Even organisations, (social systems, which ought to develop correct decisions and correct goals), are characterised by this old notion (which is in need of an overhaul). Thus, on the one hand, organisations invest many resources into justifying decisions and their factual underpinning (reason) and, on the other hand, invoke ‘entrepreneurial’ effects and actions, which are supposed to pursue the desired goals undeterred, bravely and consequently. Even such popular distinctions as those between management and leadership are based on the opposition of reason and will in Aristotelian metaphysics. This is the principle which leads to the problem that people want something which is not reasonable and why reason in action often remains so inconsequential. One is supposed to consider that, which one desires, correct, i.e. only desire what is reasonable. Therefore, people are supposed to control their passions by means of reason and the organisations should check their goals by calculation (controlling!).
This problem changes if one understands reason and will as two possibilities of differentiation, which cannot be traced back to an umbrella term but is understood as a paradox: one cannot utilise a distinction (will) and at the same time reflect upon it (reason). Everything which is done, can also be done differently (with good reasons) and all, which is considered true, must mask something else (and is, thus, criticisable). Neither the inherent good nor the absolute truth exist.